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University – Industry Collaboration in R&D:  
The Role of Labor Market Rigidity  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate how R&D university – industry collaboration (R&D UIC) is influenced by labor 
market rigidity. While it is well-established that an educated and skilled workforce will facilitate 
R&D UIC, another aspect of these alliances has been under-researched: the role of labor market 
rigidity, in particular the difficulties employers face in hiring and firing workers. We hypothesize 
that the size of the R&D labor pool in a country will encourage R&D UIC, and that the ease with 
which employers are legally allowed to hire and fire will directly and indirectly influence R&D 
UIC. Integrating data from various sources, we test our model on a sample of 73 countries for 
which information on the size of the R&D labor pool and labor market regulations are available. 
We also conduct a robustness test using a different proxy for R&D labor pool on a larger sample 
of 109 countries. Results confirm the strong link between a country’s R&D labor pool and R&D 
UIC, as well as direct negative impacts of hiring and firing rigidity and an indirect negative 
impact of hiring rigidity. The findings have implications for managers, policy makers and 
researchers of R&D collaboration between universities and industry. 
 
Key Words:  University-industry collaboration, labor market rigidity, R&D labor market pool, 
national systems of innovation 
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Introduction 
Many countries of the world have become, or are in the process of shifting towards, a 
knowledge-based entrepreneurial economy (Audrestch and Thurik, 2001). Appropriate 
regulation, decentralization, private ownership and an increase in knowledge-based activity 
figure prominently among the characteristics of these economies (Archibugi and Iammarino, 
2002; Audrestch and Thurik, 2001). In these contexts, universities have become increasingly 
conscious of the value of their intellectual assets, companies have gained awareness of the 
powerful synergies between their activities and the academic world, and university – industry 
relationships have become more widespread and diverse (Galán‐Muros and Plewa, 2016; 
Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Yoda, 2016). University – industry collaboration in R&D (R&D 
UIC) is a central feature of a national innovation system (Global Competitiveness Report 2010-
2011). 
While there exists a vast literature on R&D UIC (Freeman, 1991, 1995; Galán‐Muros and 
Plewa, 2016; Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen and Dalum, 
2002; Van Looy, Debackere and Andries, 2003), the diverse nature of these collaborations within 
a changing innovation environment have prompted calls to re-examine their organizational 
dynamics (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 2015; Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Yoda, 2016). Given that 
these collaborations are highly dependent on the underlying human and social capital in the 
economy (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 2015; Jacobsson, 2002), factors that influence the availability 
and mobility of skilled labor are key considerations for managers, policy makers and researchers 
in the field. These factors ultimately determine the sources and flows of knowledge in the 
economy, including tacit knowledge vital for innovation. 
Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable lack of research on how labor market 
institutions, specifically the legal requirements faced by employers when hiring or firing, might 
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influence R&D UIC. Zhou, Dekker and Kleinknecht (2011) noted that the “impact of flexible 
labor contracts on innovation or productivity growth is still under-researched” (Zhou, Dekker, 
Kleinknecht, 2011: 942). Simonen and McCann (2008) lamented that recent studies of 
innovation had been dominated by those emphasizing knowledge-spillovers instead of human 
capital and labor mobility explanations (Simonen and McCann, 2008: 183). We argue that, since 
both universities and industrial firms are important employers in a knowledge-based economy, 
the legal environment that surrounds and constrains them as employers will play a role in their 
propensity to collaborate in R&D. However, the literature gives little insight into how this 
potentially critical aspect of a national innovation system underpins R&D UIC. 
Our study addresses this gap. Integrating insights from academic literature on university 
– industry collaborations with studies on labor market institutions and their effects, we 
hypothesize difficulty in hiring and firing workers has direct effects on R&D UIC and indirect 
effects on the relationship between the R&D labor pool and R&D UIC. To test our hypotheses, 
we build a dataset comprising 73 countries for which R&D labor market pool and labor market 
rigidity data are available. We also run a robustness test using an alternative operationalization 
for R&D labor pool (n=109 countries). The results give broad support. In terms of direct effects, 
the R&D labor pool and labor market rigidity have statistically significant but opposite effects on 
R&D UIC. In terms of indirect effects, national laws that hinder employers’ ability to hire 
decrease the positive relationship between the R&D labor pool and R&D UIC.  
The study contributes to literature on university-industry collaboration by showing how 
labor market rigidities influence R&D collaboration between universities and industrial firms, a 
perspective largely overlooked in prior research. By demonstrating the direct and indirect effects 
of rigidity in hiring and firing laws, we provide insights that R&D managers and policy makers 
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can draw on when interpreting and enacting labor market reform in countries that are, or aspire 
to be, knowledge-based economies. 
 
Background and model development 
In the ‘triple-helix model’ of national innovation, universities, industry and governments 
coalesce around innovation, their inter-linkages and networked collaboration encouraged by 
institutions providing a basis for knowledge transfer and joint scientific exploration and 
commercialization (Etzkowitz, 2010). This national system of innovation (defined as a “well-
articulated network of firms, research centers, universities and think tanks that work together to 
take advantage of global knowledge, assimilating and adapting it to local needs, thus creating 
new technology”, World Bank, 2016), is constructed and influenced by a country’s institutions 
(Etzkowitz, 2010; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen, and Dalum, 2002; Metcalfe, 
1997; Whitley, 2002).  
More specifically, collaboration between universities and industry is recognized as a 
critical component of the national innovation system (Acworth, 2008; Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 
2015; Freeman, 1995; Galán‐Muros and Plewa, 2016; Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000; 
Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Yoda, 2016). Nelson and Winter (1982) described the 
“interweaving” of basic research and market-focused R&D, and Freeman (1995) pointed out that 
features of a national innovation system include higher education and training institutions and 
research institutes as well as private sector companies. University-industry collaboration in R&D 
(R&D UIC) enables the needs of business and society to be incorporated into basic research 
activity by allowing new ideas to be put into practice in such a way that they are viable for 
commercialization and useful ultimately to end-users, whether they are individual consumers or 
organizations (Acworth, 2008).  
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R&D UIC provides a multitude of benefits. Technology transfer from universities to 
industry can improve firms’ financial performance and develop the economy through successful 
spin-out companies (Lockett and Wright, 2005), developing a nationwide research capacity 
(Bozeman, 2000). R&D UIC also provides benefits to universities, including insights of user 
needs (Galán‐Muros and Plewa, 2016; Freeman, 1991; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen and Dalum, 
2002). Such collaborations have been useful sources of revenue for universities, and universities 
have developed strategies to engage in technology transfer through industry collaborations 
(Bruneel, D’Este and Slater, 2010; Motohashi, 2005). R&D UIC also provides opportunities for 
students and enhances university prestige. Scholars have noted potential drawbacks for 
universities as well, including threats to academic freedom and research autonomy, and 
pressures for researchers to work on commercial projects at the expense of less lucrative basic 
research (Harman, 2001). 
In addition to consequences of R&D UIC, scholars have also examined its determinants. 
In their synthesis of literature in the field of research partnerships, Hagedoorn, Link and 
Vonortas (2000) provide insights from three theoretical perspectives - transaction cost, strategic 
management and industrial organization - on incentives to engage in research collaboration. 
From the transaction cost perspective, organizations collaborate in R&D (as opposed to 
conducting all R&D in-house or through arms-length arrangements in the market) in order to 
minimize transaction costs involving technical knowledge and overcome problems relating to 
incomplete contracts. From the strategic management perspective, research collaborations allow 
firms to share R&D costs, pool risks and learn from one another in order to build new innovation 
capabilities. From an industrial organization perspective, in addition to sharing R&D costs and 
pooling risks, organizations increase market power and appropriate returns from their investment 
in the collaboration (for details see Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000). While institutional 
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determinants of R&D UIC do not feature strongly within these theories, Hagedoorn, Link and 
Vonortas (2000) also provided empirical evidence from the US, Europe and Japan on 
governmental role in promoting and supporting research partnerships. As noted above, 
institutions matter: they promote the circulation of individuals not only within, but across helices 
of the ‘triple helix’ model (Etzkowitz, 2010).  
Formal government legislation provides structure in which individuals and organizations 
(including universities and industrial firms) act and interact (North, 1990). Research shows that 
regulative institutions matter to R&D UIC: they influence the availability of skilled labor and the 
circulation of labor in the economy, such labor embodying the tacit knowledge vital for 
innovation (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 2015; Perkmann and Walsh, 2007). For example, Colyvas, 
Crow, Gelijns, Mazzoleni, Nelson, Rosenberg and Sampat (2002) showed how the Bayh-Dole 
Act of 1980 made it easier for universities to set up technology transfer offices and increase 
R&D collaborations with industry. Audretsch and Thurik (2001) insightfully noted how “the 
central role of government policy in the entrepreneurial economy is enabling in 
nature….government policy in the entrepreneurial economy targets education, increasing the 
skills and human capital of workers, and facilitating the mobility of workers…” (p. 307, 
emphasis added). Thus two elements are at play here: (1) the stock of human capital in a 
country, and (2) the mobility of that human capital. 
Firstly, in terms of human capital stock, the R&D labor pool in a country (i.e., the nation’s 
technological competence as embodied in its body of scientists and engineers and how it is 
accessed, developed and utilized) is vital to the functioning of an innovation system (Ankrah and 
AL-Tabbaa, 2015; Lawton Smith, 2006; Taplin, 2007). However, no two countries have the 
same endowments of human capital (Archibugi and CoCo, 2005). Each country has its own 
distinctive heritage in terms of universities and resources for industrial development (Lockett, 
8 
Siegel, Wright and Ensley, 2005; Trumbull, 2004; Wilson, 2012). Key to generating and 
perpetuating university-industry collaboration is a critical mass of skilled R&D workers who can 
engage in this activity from either the university or the business side. Without this mass, 
collaboration is less likely; there are lower numbers of scientists and engineers to utilize in 
collaboration. Actors are more likely to seek R&D competence outside the country, or by 
importing technology through inward FDI. The larger the R&D labor pool, the more likely 
knowledge will be generated, shared and applied through collaborative links, both in the 
scientific exploration stage as well as later stage commercialization (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 
2015). This leads to our baseline hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Ceteris paribus, the size of the R&D labor pool will have a positive 
influence on the extent of a country’s university – industry collaboration in R&D. 
 
Secondly, in terms of mobility of human capital in a country, given universities and firms 
both are important employers in a knowledge-based economy, the regulative environment that 
constrains them as employers will play a crucial role in how they collaborate in R&D. For 
decades, researchers have argued that labor market institutions affecting mobility are key 
determinants of economic success.  Some have tested the impact of labor market institutions on 
broad macroeconomic outcomes such as productivity, innovation, foreign investment flows, or 
employment and unemployment levels (see Blanchard, 2005 or Eichhorst, Feil and Braun, 
2008). These studies tended to focus on developed countries, and a consensus view emerged that 
labor-market rigidity led to less desirable macroeconomic outcomes.  Stiffer regulations on 
hiring and firing, for instance, were associated with higher unemployment rates (Blanchard and 
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Wolfer, 2000), reduced productivity (Allard and Lindert, 2006) and higher unemployment rates 
for “outsiders” such as women and youth (Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2007).  
Research relating economic outcomes to labor market institutions of developing countries 
is less common. Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2004) found a link 
between rigid labor regulations and negative macroeconomic outcomes.  Freeman (2009) 
examined employment protection in a large sample of countries and found that it shifted 
employment to informal sectors and reduced labor mobility, while Campos and Nugent (2012) 
found that rigid labor market regulation was associated with lower GDP per capita and greater 
income inequality. Hence the conventional view held that more flexible labor markets were 
needed for better economic performance.  
Scholars recently have studied links between labor market institutions and other 
indicators of economic success, with often contradictory conclusions. While some found higher 
dismissal costs (i.e., more rigidity) reduces productivity, others discovered that a higher share of 
temporary contracts (i.e., more flexibility) reduced firm productivity, while longer job tenure 
raised it (Autor, Kerr and Kugler, 2007; Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2009; Ortega and Marchante, 
2010). Others showed that firms with higher shares of temporary workers (indicating greater 
flexibility) performed less innovation, sold fewer innovative products (Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2007; Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Zhou, Dekker, Kleinknecht, 2011) and had lower patenting 
(Pieroni and Pompei, 2007).  
 
Hiring and firing: direct and indirect effects 
Difficulty in hiring occurs where the regulative environment makes it challenging for employers 
to hire employees at will. In the World Bank´s Employing Workers indicator
i
, the difficulty of 
hiring index measures whether fixed-term (temporary) contracts are prohibited for permanent 
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tasks, what the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts is, and the ratio of the minimum wage 
to value-added per worker. We argue that, if organizations are to build human capital and a 
highly skilled workforce critical for developing cutting-edge R&D (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 
2015), they need flexibility to hire temporarily, particularly in areas that are highly exploratory 
and technologically early-stage. Even though permanent contracts may give workers more 
security in which to innovate, the uncertainty surrounding exploratory research (March, 1991) 
makes it difficult for employers to assess precisely the resource requirements for longer-term 
research activities in advance (Tidd, 2001). Furthermore, R&D UIC may be based on formal 
agreements with equity stakes in new ventures (more long-term) or on informal, undefined 
arrangements which are often more short-term (Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000). The 
formal, equity types are likely to require some degree of employee mobility, particularly when 
recruiting during the establishment phase. As Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas (2000) note, 
informal arrangements inevitably involve the university acting as project-specific research “sub-
contractor”. Even though the collaboration may not involve the need for employees to be 
recruited into a new venture, or even change employment from industry to university (or vice-
versa), it is likely the university will need flexibility in employment options in order to staff 
these types of projects. Without this flexibility, this type of sub-contracting role may be unviable. 
Under these circumstances, actors will benefit from a flexible hiring environment that tolerates 
temporary contracts and flexibility in the limits to fixed time contracts. These considerations lead 
us to posit the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Ceteris paribus, rigid hiring laws will have a negative influence 
on the extent of a country’s university – industry collaboration in R&D. 
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Hypothesis 2b:  Ceteris paribus, rigid hiring laws will have a negative influence 
on the relationship between the size of the R&D labor pool within a country and 
university – industry collaboration in R&D in that country. 
 
Difficulty of firing in the World Bank indicator reflects whether redundancy is grounds 
for job termination, whether worker pre-notification or third-party approval are required for 
dismissal, and whether the employer is required to reassign or retrain workers or follow seniority 
rules before dismissing them. In competitive environments, organizations need to continually 
upgrade their capabilities in order to deal with change, remain competitive, and avoid 
organizational inertia. Technological change can force companies to make resource adjustments. 
Employers will sometimes need to reassign or remove workers whose skills have not evolved 
with emerging R&D requirements. Should formal (equity) ventures between universities and 
firms need to downsize or terminate, employers will need flexibility to do this. Organizations 
that are legally allowed to fire workers without complex and costly procedures and approval 
processes will be able to retain their most productive workers and dismiss the least suitable. 
Flexibility in firing, from the employer’s perspective, means they can fine tune resource 
allocations in line with new trends in science and technology. Restrictive firing regulations are a 
constraint for employers, inducing firms to retain their most senior workers rather than keeping 
the most innovative or productive.  Rigid firing rules could weaken incentives for learning and 
creativity and hinder firms’ development of human capital. The burden of maintaining a 
workforce not fully appropriate for leading-edge R&D, will mean employers will be less 
efficient in R&D and less able to participate in collaboration with universities. They may also be 
less attractive to others seeking collaborations in R&D. We therefore posit: 
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Hypothesis 3a:  Ceteris paribus, rigid firing laws will have a negative influence 
on the extent of a country’s university – industry collaboration in R&D. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Ceteris paribus, rigid firing laws will have a negative influence 
on the relationship between the size of the R&D labor pool within a country and 
university – industry collaboration in R&D in that country. 
 
 
Method and Results 
To test the hypotheses, we ran two sets of regression models. Firstly, we used a sample of 73 
countries for which reliable data were available for a count-based operationalization of R&D 
labor pool, i.e., the number of R&D researchers per million population per country. This sample 
covers the lion’s share of the world’s R&D: these 73 countries contained 195 out of the world’s 
top 200 universities as defined by The Times Higher Education World University Rankings; had 
a combined population of 4.84 billion people; and, on average, filed 40.69 utility patents per 
million population. Secondly, we ran a robustness test using a larger sample of 109 countries 
using an alternative operationalization of R&D labor pool – availability of scientists and 
engineers in a country. This sample also contained 195 of the world’s top 200 universities, had a 
combined population of 5.38 billion people and, on average, filed 29.62 utility patents per 
million population. Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of all the variables, definitions, 
measurements, and sources. We apply at least a one-year lag to independent variables to capture 
the lead-lag effect of explanatory variables.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Variables 
We used the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR 2010-2011) to 
operationalize university - industry collaboration in R&D. The GCR asked in its Executive 
Opinion Survey: To what extent do businesses and universities collaborate on research and 
development in your country?  Responses ranged from 1 to 7, with 1 denoting no collaboration 
and 7 extensive collaboration.  
For the operationalization of the size of the R&D labor pool in a country, we used the 
World Bank’s indicators for number of R&D researchers per million population combined with 
the number of R&D technicians per million population. For the second operationalization in the 
robustness test, we used item 12.06 from the World Economic Forum’s GCR report, namely, the 
availability of scientists and engineers. The question asked here was: In your country, to what 
extent are scientists and engineers available? Responses ranged from 1 to 7, with 7 denoting 
widely available. We note a strong positive bi-variate correlation between R&D researchers and 
availability of scientists and engineers sourced from the GCR (r=0.67, n=73), suggesting this as 
an appropriate alternative proxy.  Difficulty of hiring and firing employees was taken from the 
World Bank’s 2010 Doing Business project.  Since 2006 this project tracked the regulation of 
employment in most countries, measuring the rigidity of national legislation as it applies to 
hiring, firing, work schedules, and the cost of redundancy. It was measured on a scale of 0-100, 
with higher numbers denoting greater rigidity. 
To account for alternative explanations for the variation in university – industry R&D 
collaborations, we include four control variables: population (log transformed), GDP growth, the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and expenditure on tertiary education as a per cent of total 
education spending.   
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Model and Results 
We used a cross-sectional, time-lagged model, with the independent and control variables 
captured between 2009-2010, and the dependent variables captured in 2011. Interaction terms 
were calculated as the product using standardized scores. We tested the model using an Ordinary 
Least Squares test (OLS) and conducted tests for heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. Table 
2 reports descriptive statistics and Table 3 provides pairwise correlations for all variables.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
As expected, university - industry collaboration in R&D is positively correlated with the 
R&D labor pool (r=0.66, p<0.001) and with the HDI (r=0.58, p<0.001). The dependent variable 
is negatively correlated to difficulty in hiring (r=-0.37, p<0.001) and difficulty in firing (r=-0.32, 
p<0.01). A country’s R&D labor pool and its HDI are negatively related to GDP growth (r=-
0.41, p<0.001 and r=-0.38, p<0.001 respectively), which is a reflection of emerging markets with 
higher GDP growth rates in our dataset.  
Regression results are shown in Table 4. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were well under 
commonly accepted limits of 10 for multiple regression models (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 
1985). The greatest variance explained occurs in Model 4, with all interaction terms included. 
We find support for Hypothesis 1: the R&D labor pool has a positive and significant impact on 
R&D UIC in all models. We also find support for Hypotheses H2a and H3a: difficulty in hiring 
and firing have negative impacts (p<0.1) on R&D UIC in Models 3 and 4. Finally, we find 
support for Hypothesis 2b (negative moderating effect of difficulty hiring) but not for Hypothesis 
3b (negative moderating effect of difficulty firing). The results of the robustness test using 
availability of scientists and engineers as a proxy for the R&D labor pool in a country are shown 
in Table 5. This shows broadly similar results. Hypothesis 1 finds support across all models. In 
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terms of direct effects of labor market rigidity, we see negative signs on all coefficients. 
However, the coefficient for the direct effect of difficulty in hiring loses significance. 
Nevertheless, we find support for H2b (negative moderating effect of difficulty hiring) and H3a 
(direct negative effect of difficulty firing). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
A country’s institutions are central to the functioning of its national innovation system 
(Etzkowitz, 2010; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, Johnson, Andersen and Dalum, 2002; Whitley, 
2002). R&D collaboration between universities and industrial firms (i.e., R&D UIC) has also 
been shown to be an integral part of a national innovation system (Ankrah and AL-Tabbaa, 2015; 
Galán‐Muros and Plewa, 2016; Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000; Perkmann and Walsh, 
2007). Our approach is to examine the link between labor market institutional determinants and 
R&D UIC, with a specific focus on labor market rigidity. We believe labor market regulations 
are important because they influence how human capital circulates among universities and firms, 
making them essential, more broadly, to our understanding of institutional determinants of 
national innovation systems. While it is acknowledged that university - industry collaborations 
are highly dependent on the underlying human and social capital in the economy (Ankrah and 
AL-Tabbaa, 2015), our literature review revealed that no research had been conducted on the 
role of labor market rigidity on this specific issue. 
Our analysis shows that R&D collaboration between universities and industry is 
negatively affected, both directly and indirectly, by the rigidity of a country´s labor laws.  Rules 
that make it more onerous to fire workers have a statistically significant, negative direct impact 
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on university – industry collaboration in R&D in all models, and rigidity of rules relating to 
hiring also has a negative direct effect when we operationalize the R&D labor pool using a 
count-based measure. We also find empirical support for a negative moderating influence of 
rigid hiring rules on the relationship between the R&D labor pool and the degree of R&D UIC in 
a country. We see this in both of our tests, covering 73 and 109 countries respectively.  These 
results suggest that national laws that hinder employers’ ability to hire dampen the expected 
positive relationship between the R&D labor pool and R&D UIC. Figures 1 and 2 give a visual 
representation of this moderating effect using the count-based and perception-based measures of 
the R&D labor pool in a country.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The current study contributes to the literature on university-industry collaboration by 
putting forward, and empirically testing, an argument related to the role of labor market rigidities 
in national systems of innovation. This perspective has been largely overlooked in empirical 
research that has examined the effects of other institutional factors. In relation to previous 
studies, our analysis makes some interesting points. For instance, we add to Hagedoorn, Link and 
Vonortas’ (2000) perspective on incentives to engage in collaboration by including the role of 
labor market institutions on top of minimization of transaction costs, sharing R&D costs, pooling 
risks, and increasing market power (Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000). We provide support 
to Audretsch and Thurik’s (2001) comment about the role of government policy in an 
entrepreneurial economy facilitating the mobility of workers. In relation to specific work on 
labour market rigidity, we provide support to the ‘conventional’ view that flexibility will lead to 
more desirable outcomes, in our case: R&D UIC (Blanchard, 2005; Eichhorst, Feil and Braun, 
2008). However, our findings are not in line with studies showing a negative association between 
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innovative outcomes and flexibility (Michie and Sheehan 2003, Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; 
Pieroni and Pompei, 2007). Our analysis provides an alternative perspective and shows 
empirically that institutional forces that may prevent the flow of individuals between different 
types of employers within an economy have an important role to play. This has been overlooked 
in much of the previous work on R&D UIC. 
Despite the need for some measures to make jobs sufficiently secure so that both industry 
and universities could attract and retain valuable human capital, formal laws making both hiring 
and firing more difficult hamper university-industry collaboration. Rigid labor market rules 
affect firms as they seek to accumulate the highly skilled human capital that can lead to high-tech 
collaborations with universities on R&D initiatives. Rules that make hiring a more onerous or 
complex process reduce the positive association between a country´s abundance of skilled R&D 
workers and its level of university-industry collaboration in R&D. 
Government policymakers concentrating efforts on promoting national technological 
competence and science and technology capabilities should be cognizant of the impact that their 
labor market laws will have on circulation of skilled workers and the resulting knowledge and 
resource exchange between two of the most important types of actors in the national innovation 
system: universities and industrial firms. The need for worker security, a key element in the 
accumulation of human capital, appears to be less significant than the need for firms to remain 
agile and to reallocate labor quickly as technology or market conditions change.  Our results 
point to a flexible labor market as one of the institutional characteristics underpinning R&D UIC 
and the corresponding functioning national system of innovation. For policymakers in 
developing countries who aspire to develop knowledge-based economies, measures are needed to 
increase the supply of qualified workers, within a context of flexible and well-functioning labor 
markets.  In developed countries, policymakers should be aware that even when qualified 
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workers are abundant, rules that hamper their efficient movement around the economy may stunt 
the development of university-industry collaboration, undermining the national system of 
innovation. Results suggest that policymakers in both developed and developing countries 
seeking to promote university – industry collaboration will need to allow more flexibility in 
hiring and firing. 
The two sets of models provide a useful insight into the role played by labor market 
rigidity within a national system of innovation where labor laws apply to all types of workers, 
and to employers of scientists and engineers as well as employers of less-skilled workers. The 
different operationalizations for R&D labor pool in a country improve robustness, particularly 
for the direct effect of firing rigidity and the indirect effect of hiring rigidity. In addition, while 
human development index will correlate highly with economic development level and 
governance quality, the four control variables were selected to minimize the potential for multi-
collinearity. When entered alone these four controls account for 34% of the variance in the first 
sample, and 49% of the variance in the second. The samples encompass countries responsible for 
the vast majority of the world’s R&D and with 195 out of the world’s top 200 universities.  
Concluding remarks 
Our analysis across a large number of countries of the world in which R&D occurs has shown 
that the supply of R&D workers positively impacts the level of R&D UIC. Regulative 
institutions relating to labor market rigidity also have direct effects on R&D UIC. Furthermore, 
as the abundance of skilled workers that enable effective and efficient R&D collaboration 
increases, rigid labor laws can decrease the level of firms’ partnerships with universities for joint 
R&D. These findings advance our understanding of the role played by labor market institutions 
within a national system of innovation.  
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Nonetheless, despite these important insights and implications, our study comes with 
limitations. Firstly, our empirical analysis was limited to only two recent years of data (albeit 
with a time lag between independent and dependent variables). Secondly, we did not tease out 
specific components of labor legislation due to limited comparability across countries or lack of 
data, and we were not able to unpack different types of R&D collaborations between universities 
and industrial firms. For instance, as mentioned above, R&D UIC might not always involve new 
labor in formal arrangements or reduction in labor. Some projects, especially small-scale ones 
and those narrow in scope can be informal (Hagedoorn, Link and Vonortas, 2000), carried out by 
dispatching or ‘loaning’ of existing employees as a form of weak integration. Unfortunately, we 
were not able to disentangle this using the World Bank data. Nor could we distinguish between 
the effects of labor laws on large, routinely innovating firms and smaller “garage-style” 
entrepreneurs, who might experience regulations in opposite ways. It is possible that certain 
types of labor market rigidity, such as permanent contracts offered to new employees, would 
enhance knowledge generation and accumulation, the willingness to take risks and the degree of 
university-industry collaboration; but we were not able to isolate those effects in our empirical 
tests. Similarly, there may be countries in the world where labor market legislation applies in a 
way that depends on the educational attainment (e.g., PhD) or scientific training of the worker. 
We were not able to unpack this in the current study and future research might need to 
investigate this angle. The World Bank has recently expanded its “Employing Workers” 
indicator, and future studies may be able to focus on single features of a labor market, such as 
redundancy pay, rather than using an “umbrella” indicator for overall rigidity.  Thirdly, while our 
sample size is an improvement on country-level studies conducted on labor legislation and 
national innovation systems to date, we were not able to capture data for all countries in the 
world. We hope future research can tackle some of these issues. 
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The exploration of labor market rigidity and its implications offers a fertile avenue of 
research for scholars and policymakers interested in contemporary national innovation systems 
and technological competence of countries. The key role of human capital in exploring new 
fields of science and technology highlights the importance of the regulatory framework for labor 
relations in organizational strategy and eventual success in such environments. We hope that 
future research will build on this study to further deepen our understanding of how labor and 
other regulations affect national innovation systems and influence the dynamics of collaborations 
between universities and industry on R&D. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources 
 
Label Variable Type Definitions Measurements Sources 
University - Industry 
Collaboration in 
R&D (R&D UIC) 
Dependent Extent of business – university 
collaboration on R&D in a 
country 
Scale of 1 (does not collaborate) 
to 7 (collaborates extensively) 
(2011) 
Global Competitiveness Report (2010-2011) World 
Economic Forum  
Population (log) 
 
Control Number of inhabitants within the 
geographical boundaries of a 
country 
 
Natural log of population  World Development Indicators 2009-2010 (World 
Bank) 
GDP Growth  Control Economic growth in a country GDP growth as percentage  World Development Indicators 2009-2010 (World 
Bank) 
Human 
Development Index  
Control Composite index of life 
expectancy, education and per 
capita income 
Range from 0 (least developed) 
to 1 (most developed)  
United Nations Human Development Report (2009) 
 
Tertiary Education 
Spend % 
Control Education spending in tertiary 
sector as fraction of overall 
education spending 
Percentage World Bank Data Bank 
R&D Labor Pool Independent Volume of people employed in 
R&D in a country (per million) 
Sum of researchers in R&D per 
million + technicians in R&D 
per million 
World Development Report 2010 (World Bank) 
Difficulty in Hiring Independent / 
Moderator 
Legal requirements for fixed-term 
contracts and minimum wage 
regulations 
Units from 0-100; higher values 
indicating more rigid regulation 
Doing Business Project (World Bank), 2010 
Difficulty in Firing Independent / 
Moderator 
Legal requirements on dismissals 
for economic reasons 
Units from 0-100; higher values 
indicating more rigid regulation 
Doing Business Project (World Bank), 2010 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
R&D UIC 2.8 5.8 4.12 0.82 
Population (log)  12.67 21.01 16.60 1.55 
GDP growth -4 15 3.97 3.43 
Human Development Index  0.32 0.93 0.75 0.16 
Tertiary Education Spend % 5.16 36.44 21.46 6.24 
R&D Labor Pool (log) 2.46 9.21 6.99 23.57 
Difficulty hiring 0 89 32.25 25.97 
Difficulty firing 0 100 27.78 23.57 
n=73  
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
  
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7 
R&D UIC 1       
 
Population (log) 2 0.07      
 
GDP growth 3 -0.08 0.33**     
 
Human Dev. Index 4  0.58*** -0.10 -0.38***    
 
Tertiary Edu. Spend % 5 0.23+ -0.11 -0.04 0.19   
 
R&D Labor Pool (log) 6 0.66*** -0.06 -0.41*** 0.82*** 0.19  
 
Difficulty Hiring 7 -0.37*** -0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.27** -0.19 
 
Difficulty Firing 8 -0.32** 0.14 0.05 -0.12 -0.12 0.31** 0.31** 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
n=73 
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Table 4 
Regression results 
 
 
R&D UIC 
 
  
Hypothesis 
1 2 3 4 
      
Population (log)   0.05 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
      
GDP Growth  0.03 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
 
Human 
Development 
Index  
 3.13*** 
(0.54) 
0.93 
(0.87) 
0.70 
(0.83) 
0.63 
(0.83) 
      
Tertiary Education 
Spend % 
 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
      
      
      
R&D Labor Pool 
(log) 
H1 (+)  0.44** 
(0.14) 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
      
Difficulty Hiring H2a (-)   -0.14+ 
(0.08) 
-0.16+ 
(0.08) 
      
Difficulty Firing H3a (-)   -0.14+ 
(0.08) 
-0.14+ 
(0.08) 
      
R&D Labor Pool 
X Difficulty 
Hiring 
H2b (-)    -0.14+ 
(0.08) 
      
R&D Labor Pool 
X Difficulty Firing 
H3b (-)    -0.01 
(0.08) 
      
      
Max. VIF  1.31 3.56 3.58 3.58 
F  10.23*** 11.22*** 10.12*** 8.51*** 
F Change   9.83** 4.44* 1.88 
Adj. R2  0.34 0.42 0.47 0.49 
      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   Standard errors in parentheses. 
All models, n=73 
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Table 5 
Robustness test using availability of scientists and engineers as proxy for R&D labor pool 
 
 
R&D UIC 
 
  
Hypothesis 
1 2 3 4 
      
Population (log)   0.09+ 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
      
GDP Growth  0.04 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
 
Human 
Development 
Index  
 3.40*** 
(0.40) 
2.13*** 
(0.41) 
1.94*** 
(0.40) 
1.78*** 
(0.40) 
      
Tertiary Education 
Spend % 
 0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
      
      
      
Availability of 
Scientists and 
Engineers (R&D 
Labor Pool)  
H1 (+)  0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.07) 
0.45*** 
(0.07) 
      
Difficulty Hiring H2a (-)   -0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
      
Difficulty Firing H3a (-)   -0.15* 
(0.06) 
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
      
R&D Labor Pool 
X Difficulty 
Hiring 
H2b (-)    -0.12+ 
(0.07) 
      
R&D Labor Pool 
X Difficulty Firing 
H3b (-)    -0.05 
(0.06) 
      
      
Max. VIF  1.24 1.95 1.99 2.00 
F  26.88*** 35.81*** 28.28*** 23.81*** 
F Change   35.66*** 4.01* 3.42* 
Adj. R2  0.49 0.62 0.64 0.66 
      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   Standard errors in parentheses. 
All models, n=109 
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Figure 1. Impact of Difficulty in Hiring on the Relationship between R&D Researchers and 
R&D UIC in 73 Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Impact of Difficulty in Hiring on the Relationship between Availability of Scientists 
and Engineers R&D UIC in 109 Countries 
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